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Abstract 
A Kelly strategy theoretically optimizes the growth rate of investor’s capital. This paper 
evaluates its usefulness on the Swedish stock market between 2005 and 2015 by comparing 
returns to that of common portfolio strategies and a market index. We conclude that the Kelly 
strategy produces returns around five times that of the market for the same period. After 
conducting robustness tests, the results are less convincing.  
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1. Introduction  
 
A Kelly strategy as defined by Ziemba (2016) is a scheme that enables investors to find the 
growth optimal allocation of securities to maximize their final wealth. This strategy is based 
on Kelly’s (1956) criterion, which defines the long-run growth optimal allocation size. 
Several studies examine the implementation of a Kelly strategy on financial markets but are 
divided in their conclusions. Roll (1973) shows that the Kelly strategy applied as a portfolio 
strategy is statistically indistinguishable from the market portfolio in terms of rate of returns, 
whereas Estrada (2010) argues it is superior in terms of long-term growth to traditional 
strategies. The theoretical framework on the properties of Kelly’s criterion is commonly 
accepted (see Davis & Lleo, 2014; Rotando & Thorp, 1992; Thorp, 2006) meanwhile the 
usefulness in practice remains undetermined. With this in mind, the problem statement in this 
thesis is whether investors would benefit (“benefit” evaluated based on performance relative 
to benchmarks) from applying a Kelly strategy in practice and whether its previous findings 
are aligned with our findings from the Swedish stock market from 2005 to 2015.  
 
Our purpose is to provide the reader with an objective evaluation of this strategy. We 
examine the applicability of a Kelly strategy in practice, i.e., apply a Kelly strategy to 
empirical data and compare it to other portfolio choice approaches. We use all data on 
Swedish listed stocks from 2005 to 2015. The intuition behind the choice of Swedish equities 
in our analysis is based on the fact that there is no previous evidence for implementations of a 
Kelly strategy on this asset class and market. In this paper, we show how the Kelly strategy 
differs in returns and in volatility of the returns. Estrada (2010) concludes that the Kelly 
strategy is, in fact, superior in terms of long-term growth to traditional strategies. In line with 
this, we illustrate that it is a relevant long-term allocation strategy in terms of wealth growth. 
However, there are potential biases in our results, hence we conduct a number of robustness 
analysis. We conclude that the robustness returns are in fact lower when adjusted. Since our 
adjustments are of major importance in order to evaluate the strategy, we build our analysis 
by looking at both the adjusted and the unadjusted Kelly portfolios when comparing to our 
benchmark strategies. Finally, we want to highlight how a rational and growth maximizing 
investor following a Kelly strategy might differ in their allocation relative to the market 
portfolio.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical 
framework, which serves as a foundation on which this paper is built. First the Kelly strategy 
and formula are presented and discussed, whereby the existing literature is highlighted. In 
Section 3, we explain the method used throughout the paper and how we proceed by applying 
the Kelly strategy on the financial market. In the same section we also do a robustness test on 
our method. Section 4 presents our results, which also include robustness tests of the Kelly 
strategy. Our findings are later included in the final discussion in Section 5. Finally, in 
Section 6 we bring forward our conclusion.  
 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Kelly strategy  
A Kelly strategy is the implementation of Kelly’s (1956) criterion but to avoid confusion we 
only use the term Kelly strategy throughout this paper. To understand the intuition behind the 
usage of a Kelly strategy, consider a scenario where there are favourable (i.e., the probability 
to win is larger than the probability to lose) bets at hand available to choose from. Next, we 
proceed to determine what this bet should amount to, measured as a fraction of total wealth at 
hand. The Kelly strategy determines the optimal bet size for us in terms of growth 
maximization. Thorp, MacLean, & Ziemba (2011) demonstrate in practice how gambling 
houses can be beaten by individuals implementing a Kelly strategy, through betting the 
optimal fraction of their wealth.  
 
The general formula used to implement the Kelly strategy for independent investments is to a 
high degree identical to the Sharpe ratio but uses variance instead of volatility, which is 
demonstrated below. The logic behind this is explained by, for example, Thorp (2006) who 
uses Tucker’s theorem to transform the function into a Brownian motion. To use the Kelly 
formula one needs to estimate excess returns and return volatilities for securities. Following 
this, the optimal allocation of a portfolio consisting of these securities is constructed. Below 
we derive the Kelly formula. First we look at the discrete probabilities case, used in betting. 
Thereafter, we present two derivations of the formula used for continuous probabilities, one 
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illustrated in the next section, and one included in the appendix. Continuous probabilities are 
applicable when investing.  
2.1.1 Kelly (1956) Formula for Discrete Probabilities  
Assume a favourable bet with probability !" < 𝑝 ≤ 1 and outcome 1, a losing probability of 𝑞 = 1 − 𝑝 with outcome -1, and that the odds are even. The initial wealth is denominated by 𝑊+. The wealth after n trials, betting a fraction f of the initial wealth, is given by 
 𝑊, = 𝑊+ 1 + 𝑓 /(1 − 𝑓),2/	
   
The exponential rate of asset growth per trial, equal to the logarithm of the geometric mean, 
can be restated by 
 
𝐺, 𝑓 = log 𝑊,𝑊+ !, = 	 log 1 + 𝑓)/, 1 − 𝑓 ,2/,  = 𝑚𝑛 log 1 + 𝑓 + 𝑛 −𝑚𝑛 log	(1 − 𝑓) 
 
Our expected growth rate is given by 
 𝐸 𝐺,(𝑓) = 𝑔 𝑓 = 𝑝	 ∙ 	 log 1 + 𝑓 + 𝑞 ∙ log 1 − 𝑓 = 𝐸 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑊)  
 
where 𝑝 is defined as the winning probability and 𝑞 the losing probability. Maximizing 𝑔 𝑓  
with respects to 𝑓 results in 𝑞? 𝑓 = 	 𝑝1 + 𝑓 − 𝑞1 − 𝑓 = 𝑝 − 𝑞 − 𝑓(1 + 𝑓)(1 − 𝑓) = 0 ⇔ 𝑓 = 𝑓∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑞,			𝑝 ≥ 𝑞 > 0 
 
The second derivative with regards to f shows that f = f* is the unique maximum of the 
function 𝑔 𝑓∗ = 𝑝 ∙ log 𝑝 + 𝑞 ∙ log 𝑞 + log 2 > 0 𝑞?? G = − 𝑝1 + 𝑓 " − 𝑞(1 − 𝑓)" < 0 
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Theorem 1 (Kelly): the optimal fraction, under Bernoulli trials, which should be invested per 
trial, is f* = p-q, the edge. This fixed fraction strategy maximizes the expected value of the 
logarithm of capital at each trial (Kelly 1956). 
 
Thorp (1971) points out that maximizing the expected logarithm of wealth E[log(Wt)] is 
equivalent to maximizing the exponential rate of growth per time period g(f).  
 
Now, moreover, we assume that the odds are not even such that 𝜊 ∈ ℝK; thus, a game is 
favourable if po - q > 0, which results in a variation of the logarithm of the geometric growth 
rate 𝑔 𝑓, 𝑜 = 𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑔 1 + 𝑜𝑓 + 𝑞𝑙𝑜𝑔 1 − 𝑓  
Which is maximized by 𝑓∗ = 𝑜𝑝 − 𝑞𝑜 = 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 
The optimal fraction of wealth one uses to bet, 𝑓∗, is presented above. In the next section we 
derive it in another way and translate inputs into financial terms so that the formula is 
applicable when investing. 
2.1.2 Thorp’s (2006) continuous approximation  
Since our goal is to apply the Kelly criterion on stocks, a similar result for a continuous 
distribution is relevant (Thorp 2006). The goal is still to maximize 𝑔 𝑓 = 𝐸 log 1 + 𝑓𝑥 =log	(1 + 𝑓𝑥 = 𝑑𝑃(𝑥) with P(x) being a probability measure and f a fraction of capital 
invested. Also we assume constraints 1 + 𝑓𝑥 > 0, such that log can be defined, and 𝑓Q = 1. 
If the outcomes of x are a symmetric random variable around E(x)= µ with Var(x) = σ2 we can 
describe the wealth W as 𝑊 𝑓 = 𝑊+ 1 + 1 − 𝑓 𝑟 + 𝑓𝑥 = 𝑉+[1 + 𝑟 + 𝑓 𝑥 − 𝑟 ] 
r is the return on the risk free, thus g(f) is 𝑔 𝑓 = 𝐸 𝐺 𝑓 = 𝐸𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑊 𝑓𝑊+ = 𝐸	log	[1 + 𝑟 + 𝑓 𝑥 − 𝑟 ] 
With subdivided time intervals with T independent steps 𝑊V(𝑓)𝑊+ = [1 + 1 − 𝑓 𝑟 + 𝑓𝑥W]VWX!  
Taking the expectation and natural logarithm on both sides allows us to calculate g(f) from a 
second order Taylor-approximation as 
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𝑔 𝑓 = 𝑟 + 𝑓 𝜇	 − 	𝑟 − 𝜎"𝑓"2 + 𝑂 𝑛2!"  
As t approaches ∞, 𝑂 𝑛2\]  approaches 0 resulting in 
𝑔^ 𝑓 = 𝑟 + 𝑓 𝜇	 − 	𝑟 − 𝜎"𝑓"2  
Differentiating g(f) with respect to f   𝜕𝑔^(𝑓)𝜕𝑓 = 	𝜇 − 𝑟 − 𝜎"𝑓 = 0 ⇔ 𝑓∗ = 𝜇	 − 	𝑟𝜎"  
 
This is the Kelly formula, where 𝜇 is the return, r is the risk-free rate, and 𝜎" is the return 
variance. 𝑓∗ is the weight each security receives in the Kelly portfolio, or put in other words, 
the fraction of our wealth at hand we should invest in each security. Generally, in terms of 
risk and return, a portfolio based on a Kelly strategy differs significantly from other 
strategies. MacLean, Thorp, & Ziemba (2010) state that it is often prone to larger risk 
exposures due to the volatile and undiversified nature of an optimal Kelly strategy portfolio. 
This is because the strategy requires investors to frequently invest large fractions into few 
securities which common portfolio strategies, for example, equal weight or mean-variance, 
do not. Through estimating the inputs in the formula above, investors find the optimal long-
term (long-term is defined based on frequency of trades in this case) allocation size for each 
security in the portfolio.  
 
Kelly (1956) build on Bernoulli’s (1738) utility theory, which states that marginal utility is a 
function of log wealth where increasing wealth induces lower marginal utility, where Kelly 
showed the maximization of the one period expected log of wealth. Latané (1959) 
independently implements Kelly’s ideas as an investment criterion. This marked the first step 
in the usage of the Kelly criterion on financial markets and investing. Breiman (1961) shows 
that using the Kelly criterion is asymptotically optimal under two paradigms: first, it produces 
the maximal rate of increase of wealth and secondly it minimizes the expected time to 
achieve a fixed level of resources. Thorp (1969) concludes that the Kelly criterion should 
replace the Markowitz criterion (Markowitz 1959) as the guide to portfolio selection. 
Additionally, Thorp (2006) states that Kelly bettors maximize expected one-period log of 
wealth, and they are certain to win if the horizon is sufficiently long. Samuelson (1979), on 
the other hand, is critical towards the Kelly criterion and points out that  ‘when you lose – 
and you sure can lose – with N large, you can lose real big.’ 
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2.2 Strengths and Limitations With a Kelly Strategy  
MacLean, Thorp, & Ziemba (2010b) discuss a wide array of properties of the Kelly strategy. 
Amongst the positive characteristics discussed is, for example, the fact that the log growth of 
wealth bettor never risks ruin (Hakansson, & Miller 1975), maximizing log growth of wealth 
also asymptotically maximizes the rate of asset growth (Breiman 1961), and finally that the 
absolute amount bet is monotone increasing in wealth (MacLean, Thorp, and Ziemba, 
(2010b)). Markowitz (1959) states that even though Kelly’s (1956) Criterion might not 
maximize the expected utility of wealth by maximizing the mean return it may still be a 
plausible and useful theory. 
 
There are several key issues with a Kelly strategy when applied as an investment criterion. 
The most crucial is based on the fact that the market for financial instruments is characterized 
by uncertainty of future returns, which makes estimation of the probability of a certain 
outcome hard to determine. Since tomorrow’s outcome is highly uncertain, and requires 
estimation, modeling uncertainty and forecasting errors can be high. This problem is likely to 
apply in this paper; to obtain the required inputs for the Kelly formula we are forced to rely 
on historical data and make predictions.  
 
The problem mentioned above is also recognized in practice. Samuelson (1963) argues that if 
a rational individual rejects a single favourable bet, he would also reject a large number of 
such bets. In another paper, Samuelson (1971) agrees that aiming to maximize the geometric 
mean return would lead to a maximization of the terminal wealth given a timeframe which is 
long enough, but that this strategy would not necessarily maximize the expected utility unless 
the underlying utility function is logarithmic. He then concludes “the geometric-mean 
strategy is not optimal for any finite number of periods”.  
2.3 Empirical Evidence 
Research papers on this topic and its implementation as a portfolio strategy in practice are 
rare. Estrada (2010) conducts a study similar to this thesis. He concludes that the Kelly 
criterion is, in fact, superior in terms of long-term growth to traditional strategies. 
Meanwhile, Estrada’s analysis also shows that Kelly portfolios are less diversified, have a 
higher (arithmetic and geometric) mean return, and higher volatility than benchmark 
portfolios. Additionally, Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppé (2009) find that the Kelly rule 
 
 
11 
 
insures the survival of investors continuously applying this rule. Finally, MacLean, Thorp & 
Ziemba (2010) show the immense increase in return achieved when investing by Kelly’s 
strategy.  
 
In contrast to Estrada’s findings, Roll (1973) concludes that the Kelly Strategy is statistically 
indistinguishable from the market portfolio. Worth to mention, though, is that Roll’s findings 
emerge from studies on the NYSE and AMEX in the 1970s, whereas we will look at a 
different time era and market. Furthermore, Thorp (1971) shows the Kelly strategy is not 
mean-variance efficient ex ante. Cover (1991) illustrates how a universal portfolio with an 
equally weighted strategy outperforms a performance weighted (i.e., Kelly strategy based) 
portfolio. Finally, Markowitz (1976) concludes that the Kelly strategy was the limiting mean-
variance portfolio under the assumption that an investor follows the strategy in the long run. 
 
To conclude, Kelly’s (1956) criterion is a high-risk portfolio strategy and prone to great 
uncertainty. Opinions on the effectiveness of a Kelly strategy vary; our goal is thus to test the 
strategy with data from the Swedish stock market to analyze how it performs in practice. An 
explanation of how we proceed with this implementation is presented in the Section 3.  
3. Methods 
To get the return component in the Kelly formula, we identify stocks that we believe have 
potential for positive abnormal returns, in order to find our edge. To identify such firms we 
define a ranking system. First, stocks are ranked based on a selection of multiples. 
Additionally, after the first screening process, the stocks in this universe are ranked again 
based on how they rank combined for the three multiples. Firms with low P/B-and P/E ratios 
and a high Gross Margin relative to all other listed Swedish equities get the best score. “Low” 
is defined as any value above 0 (if a firm has a multiple value of 0 it is excluded from our 
universe). “High” is defined as any value, which is positive; the higher the value of the Gross 
Margin the better. On average, during our 43 quarterly observations from 2005 to 2015, our 
universe consists of 109 stocks after they have been ranked. Once these stocks are identified 
we start building the portfolios, of which one allocation scheme is based on the Kelly 
strategy, and analyze their performance in relation to benchmark portfolio choices. In the 
next sections, we explain the intuition behind the choice of multiples and why multiples 
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should have a high or low value respectively, whereby we proceed by illustrating how and 
why we use selected benchmark portfolios to compare to our Kelly portfolio.  
3.1 Multiple Screening Criterions  
To find stocks with potential of abnormal returns relative to the market, SBX, we use a 
multiple approach. Three key ratios with theorized potential for outperformance relative to 
the market have been selected; the P/B-ratio with close similarities to the B/M-ratio from the 
Fama and French (1992), gross margin, and the P/E ratio. The choice behind these multiples 
is based on previous research on multiple strength and predictive power of returns. We 
provide details below.  
 
Finally, for each section where we explain our multiples, we also conduct our own analysis 
on the ability of our multiples to predict returns through a robustness test. This is made in 
order to support our choice with more evidence than that from previous studies only and also 
because the choice of multiples influence the data from which we conduct all calculations1.  
3.1.1 Price-to-Book Ratio 
Banz (1981) shows that firms with high book-to-market ratio, i.e., value stocks, outperform 
those with a lower ratio. Put in other words, these stocks are undervalued and thus experience 
a value premium. Fama and French (1992) build on this idea and introduce the 3-factor model 
where one factor is the High Minus Low Book-to-Market ratio. In this paper, this factor is 
referred to as the Price-to-Book ratio; by looking at stocks with a low Price-to-Book ratio we 
obtain the equivalence of a high B/M-ratio (B/M is simply P/B inverted, hence we look for 
low P/B stocks), with the only difference being that the HML factor looks at portfolios 
whereas when using the P/B-ratio we look at individual securities. We do this to find stocks 
that theoretically could experience strong performance, which our P/B-multiple should be 
indicative of.   
                                                
1 This robustness test of multiples induces high exposure to errors, though, since we look at US equities, due to data availability. Also, due 
to the huge amount of observations we only look at the year of 2015. Yet, this enables us to get a general perception of how these multiples 
have performed empirically.  
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Figure 1: Predictive Power of the P/B-ratio. This figure shows the predictive power of the 
P/B-ratio. Data on US equities is retrieved from Morningstar.fundamentals API and 
Quantopian.USEquityPricing API. Sample period is 2015-2016 (12 months) and n= 985 559. 
The x-axis shows 100 portfolios, which are divided, based on the size of the multiple. From 
left to right we have the lowest to the highest value of the multiple applied as a screening 
criterion on the portfolios. The y-axis shows the multiple’s predictive power of realized 
return, measured daily. 
 
Figure 1 reveals that portfolios based on a low multiple are ineffective at predicting returns; 
the first 10 portfolios, which are selected based on the lowest P/B-ratio relative to the other 
portfolios, only yield negative returns. Thus, using a low P/B-ratio to screen stocks would not 
predict future returns for US equities during 2015.  
3.1.2 Gross Margin 
We also include the gross margin to look for persistence in the Earnings-to-Cost-of-Goods-
Sold (COGS) ratio. By identifying persistence in earnings amongst firms, this demonstrates 
strong performance and a solid market position. Novy-Marx (2013), for example, builds on 
this idea and states, “profitable firms generate significantly higher returns than unprofitable 
firms”.  
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Figure 2: Predictive Power of the Gross Margin. This figure shows the predictive power of 
the Gross Margin. Data on US equities is retrieved from Morningstar.fundamentals API and 
Quantopian.USEquityPricing API. Sample period is 2015-2016 (12 months) and n= 985 559. 
The x-axis shows 100 portfolios, which are divided, based on the size of the multiple. From 
left to right we have the lowest to the highest value of the multiple applied as a screening 
criterion on the portfolios. The y-axis shows the multiple’s predictive power of realized 
return, measured daily. 
 
Figure 2 depicts that a high Gross Margin applied as a criterion on portfolio screening, has 
quite strong predictive power of returns, which is illustrated in the right section of the figure. 
This is in line with what we hope this multiple will do for us, but also with what the previous 
literature (see: Novy-Marx (2013)) states; firms with persistence in earnings experience 
higher returns. Hence, we can conclude that in this data set investors could somewhat predict 
future returns by identifying firms with a high Gross Margin, based on US equities during 
2015. 
3.1.3 P/E ratio 
Finally, we look at the P/E ratio as an indicator of returns. This key ratio is widely used as a 
measure of valuation within finance. Furthermore, Basu (1977) shows this multiple has 
predictive power in measuring firm performance; he concludes that portfolios consisting of 
firms with a low P/E outperform portfolios where firms have relatively higher P/E-ratios. 
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Thus, we also use a low P/E-ratio when screening the Swedish stock market to find abnormal 
returns. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Predictive Power of P/E-ratio. This figure shows the predictive power of the P/E-
ratio. Data on US equities is retrieved from Morningstar.fundamentals API and 
Quantopian.USEquityPricing API. Sample period is 2015-2016 (12 months) and n= 985 559. 
The x-axis shows 100 portfolios, which are divided, based on the size of the multiple. From 
left to right we have the lowest to the highest value of the multiple applied as a screening 
criterion on the portfolios. The y-axis shows the multiple’s predictive power of realized 
return, measured daily. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the multiple is a relatively poor predictor of returns for US equities during 
2015. Again, the first portfolio percentiles, which have been created based on stocks with a 
low P/E-ratio, experience negative returns. This implies that a low P/E-ratio does not have 
predictive power of returns based on US equities 2015. 
3.2 Robustness of Multiples  
The previous three figures show two of the multiples are weak in terms of predictive power 
of returns. Yet, in our study, all our portfolios created based on these criteria combined 
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outperform the SBX (illustrated in the results in Section 4). Perhaps this is due to the fact that 
our implementation of the multiples is during a longer time period, which strengthens the 
predictability of the multiples, but it could also be due to the fact that the three ratios are very 
general measurements of valuation. In other words, one can conclude that investors could 
have benefited, in terms of predicting returns, during the period 2005 to 2015 from using a 
ranking system on the Swedish stock market based on the combined multiples we explained 
above. To support this we conduct another robustness test for our multiples where we also 
look at sum of rank of monthly correlations between two key ratios at a time. Correlations 
imply one of the factors contains information about the other factor. Our goal is to have three 
key ratios, which are as uncorrelated as possible so that each multiple capture firm effects and 
consequently returns independent of the other two. This translates into extensive measures of 
returns2. 
 
 
Figure 4: Sum of Rank of Monthly Correlation between P/B-ratio and P/E-ratio. This figure 
shows correlation between the P/B-ratio and the P/E-ratio. Data on US equities is retrieved 
from Morningstar.fundamentals API and Quantopian.USEquityPricing API. Sample period is 
2015-2016 (12 months) and n= 985 559. The x-axis shows monthly portfolios. The y-axis 
                                                
2 Again, we look at US equities for the period 2015 below as well, hence the conclusions we draw are very general and not necessarily 
applicable to the Swedish data we use later in the paper. However, as we choose such general multiples to find predictive power we still 
believe the test is relevant. 
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shows the sum of rank of monthly correlations, measured by looking at the rank of one factor 
(i.e. multiple) versus the rank of the other factor, and returns in each factor rank.  
 
Figure 4 highlights that there is a tendency for weak positive correlation; the average monthly 
sum rank of correlation between the two key ratios is around 0,18. This implies that, together, 
these multiples are fairly extensive in measuring returns, meaning they capture returns 
separately from one another. This increases the probability that we do identify as many of the 
best performing firms as possible. In terms of having two independent measures, we can 
conclude that, based on US equities during 2015, these two multiples are relevant. 
 
Figure 5: Sum of Rank of Monthly Correlation between P/E-ratio and Gross Margin. This 
figure shows correlation between the P/E-ratio and Gross Margin. Data on US equities is 
retrieved from Morningstar.fundamentals API and Quantopian.USEquityPricing API. Sample 
period is 2015-2016 (12 months) and n= 985 559. The x-axis shows monthly portfolios. The 
y-axis shows the sum of rank of monthly correlations, measured by looking at the rank of one 
factor (i.e. multiple) versus the rank of the other factor, and returns in each factor rank.  
 
Compared to Figure 4, Figure 5 shows that more observations experience much weaker 
correlation; this means that the two key ratios are less correlated in their predictive power of 
return, and measure performance correspondingly to a smaller extent. We can conclude that 
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the P/E-ration and Gross Margin are also relevant since they are independent of one another, 
with an average monthly sum of rank correlation of 0,08. 
 
 
Figure 6: Sum of Rank of Monthly Correlation between P/B-ratio and Gross Margin. This 
figure shows correlation between the P/B-ratio and Gross Margin. Data on US equities is 
retrieved from Morningstar.fundamentals API and Quantopian.USEquityPricing API. Sample 
period is 2015-2016 (12 months) and n= 985 559. The x-axis shows monthly portfolios. The 
y-axis shows the sum of rank of monthly correlations, measured by looking at the rank of one 
factor (i.e. multiple) versus the rank of the other factor, and returns in each factor rank.  
 
In line with previous reasoning, Figure 6 depicts that the P/B-ratio and Gross Margin share 
some similarities in the ability to predict returns for US equities during 2015, even though the 
correlation is low. This slightly stronger monthly sum of rank correlation of around 0.20 on 
average is something we want to avoid since our goal with the three key multiples is that they 
are as extensive as possible in predicting future returns. Meanwhile, as with Figure 4 and 5, 
Figure 6 experiences no significant dependence3.  
                                                
3 Finally, we again want to emphasize the fact that our robustness test of the multiples look at US equities due to data availability and 
simplicity, whereas our main test and results in this paper is based on Swedish equities. The idea is to conduct a robustness test on empirical 
data, independent of what previous literature says, which is as similar as possible to the Swedish data we use in this thesis, hence we believe 
the test is still relevant. 
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Our takeaway from the first robustness test on predictive power of return is less in line with 
the findings from the Swedish stock market; Figures 1 & 3 show that the multiples have weak 
predictive power of return. The second test, though, illustrated through Figures 4 to 6, show 
that the multiples are uncorrelated which is a sign of strength in terms of capturing as much 
of future return as possible. This leads us to the conclusion that the robustness tests have 
mixed results, but there is evidence for the strength of our selected multiple’s ability to 
predict returns.  
3.3 Portfolios 
We form portfolios out of stocks that meet criteria in section 3.2. The portfolios are 
rebalanced on a quarterly basis; in this way we attempt to avoid Proebsting’s Paradox, which 
states that the risk of over betting increases when string bets are involved (further explained 
in Appendix B). Furthermore, we choose to rebalance quarterly since there is new 
information on our multiples from the quarterly reports from the firms in our universe. 
Finally, the intuition behind our method of selecting stocks with a rolling window is to 
control for survivorship bias; if our model chooses a stock that later gets delisted, the 
contributing total return is calculated from the day of purchase until the last trading day’s 
close.  
 
When the Kelly strategy shows a high excess return-to-variance ratio, the number of stocks in 
our portfolio narrows, which increases weights (and thus decreases number of total securities) 
of our investments going forward. One portfolio allocation is based on the Kelly strategy, 
which is then compared to four other portfolio strategies with different weighting techniques; 
mean-variance, equally weighted, value weighted, and a high beta portfolio. Altogether, the 
five strategies are compared to one another in terms of risk and return. We also look at the 
allocation of stocks. Whereas traditional portfolio strategies often seek to maximize the return 
per unit of risk, the Kelly portfolio is designed to maximize return solely. Consequently, 
volatility can be extremely high relatively. For this reason, we include the relatively more 
aggressive high beta strategy portfolio as our fourth benchmark and weighting strategy 
(where “high” is defined as the higher the value the better), where Bloomberg creates a fourth 
rank and again rank all stocks combined with the beta criteria added. The other three 
portfolios are commonly used strategies. Finally, each individual portfolio is also compared 
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to the OMX Stockholm Benchmark Index (SBX). This is a market index of all Swedish 
equities listed on the Stockholm Exchange, which is weighted based on market cap and 
where dividends are reinvested. We use this primarily to compare the Kelly portfolio to the 
market, but also to look at the benchmark portfolio strategies in relation to the market index. 
Later, this index is also leveraged to the same volatility levels as Kelly to look at the 
performance when volatility levels are the same, in order to compare the risk-return tradeoff. 
All the benchmark portfolios are simulated through Bloomberg terminals, whereas Kelly is 
calculated manually.  
3.3.1 Kelly Portfolio 
A Kelly portfolio is often prone to large concentrated investments when the expected return is 
relatively high and has a high probability to be achieved. Therefore, it also tends to produce 
undiversified portfolios, which previous studies show (see for example: Nekrasov, 2014). We 
begin the construction of our Kelly portfolio through taking the average return for all selected 
stocks for each quarter between 2005 and 2015. From this return we then subtract the repo 
rate gathered from the Swedish Riksbank corresponding to that quarter, and finally we divide 
by the variance of the 3-month return to get the Kelly weight. For each quarter, the number of 
stocks included is based on the weight corresponding to that period. For example, let us 
assume we want to calculate the weight in the period Q2 2006. We retrieve average 3-month 
total return for all individual stocks for the preceding quarter, Q1 2006, which contains our 
universe that has been created through the ranking system, and proceed by calculating the 
total average for all stocks. This is our return component for Q2 2006. The value of returnW2! is thus of importance since it is used for our returnW component, whereby we 
assume that returnW2! will have predictive power for the following quarter. This is also why 
we earlier stressed the importance of predictive power of return. Thereafter, we adjust for the 
risk-free rate, whereby we divide by the variance of returns for the same universe of stocks. If 
the Kelly formula tells us the weight is 0.5, we include the top two ranking stocks within the 
universe since the formula indicates portfolio weights should be 50%. Additionally, we 
calculate the individual return for the two stocks and multiply by each stock’s weight (in this 
case 0.5 for both stocks). We are left with the total return for our portfolio for Q2 2006 and 
proceed by doing this for all quarters. In this way we have 43 quarterly observations during 
the 11-year time period between 2005-2015, where our first Kelly weight is the 31st of March 
2005. 
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3.3.2 Equally Weighted Portfolio 
An equally weighted portfolio gives the same weight to all securities in the portfolio.  
Finnerman and Kirchmann (2015) state, “the rationale behind the equal weighting technique 
is to avoid a large concentration of only a few stocks in the portfolio.” Additionally, 
Markowitz (1952) illustrates the strengths of this portfolio strategy.  
3.3.3 Market Capitalization (Value) Portfolio 
This strategy assigns weights based on size; larger firms receive larger portfolio weight. If 
implemented under CAPM assumptions it can be regarded as the market portfolio (Zhang, 
Shan, & Su 2009).  
3.3.4 Mean-Variance Portfolio 
The mean-variance portfolio, or Active Risk Minimized as defined in Bloomberg, is a 
portfolio simulated by Bloomberg. Active risk exists when managers seek to beat the market; 
they take on more risk to obtain excessive returns which gives rise to tracking errors, also 
defined as active risk. Bloomberg specifies that under the constraint that this portfolio will 
take long positions only, it behaves like Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio. We impose the 
long only constraint to achieve this, meaning there is no short selling in this portfolio. Finally, 
this portfolio is very similar to the market portfolio. 
3.3.5 High Beta Portfolio 
The first three strategies compared to the Kelly strategy are, ex post, significantly less 
exposed to risk, measured as volatility of returns, and prone to diversification. Yet, by adding 
stocks with a beta larger than one our goal is to include firms which have more market risk 
than the other portfolio benchmarks, creating a portfolio which is more similar to Kelly in its’ 
risk characteristics. Consequently, we have one portfolio we hope is more similar, creating a 
more solid ground for comparison.  
3.3.6 SBX and Leveraging the SBX 
We also compare all strategies to the market portfolio (SBX). Finally, we create a portfolio, 
which is the market (SBX), with the exact same, ex post, volatility characteristics as the Kelly 
portfolio. We do this to look at whether the Kelly returns are solely due to higher volatility of 
returns and if this has explanatory power for the returns in our Kelly portfolio.  
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3.4 Kelly Portfolio Industries  
 
Industry Kelly (%) SBX (%) 
Financials 31,5 33,5 
Industrials 16,1 29,8 
Consumer Goods 13,7 9,5 
Consumer Services 11,3 8,3 
Technology 6,5 6,0 
Health Care 14.5 4,6 
Telecommunication 3,2 4,3 
Oil & Gas 2,4 1,0 
Basic Materials 0,8 3,0 
Table 1: Industry Breakdown for Kelly Portfolios and SBX  
Table 1 illustrates the largest industry holdings based on our Kelly portfolios and SBX. Data 
is retrieved from Bloomberg and Nasdaq for the period 2005 to 2015.  
 
The inclusion of firms is based on if they have low P/B-and P/E-ratio and high gross margin, 
which favours some industries over others. Our take on why the average industry composite 
for Kelly looks the way it does in Table 1, is for example because firms investing in Real 
Estate have high book values, and thus a low P/B-ratio, scoring high in our ranking. 
Furthermore, firms in the financial sector have relatively low Cost Of Goods Sold in relation 
to revenue, which increases the gross margin. This partially explains why the most frequent 
industry in our portfolios is financials. Finally, the same applies for the industries at the 
bottom of the table, only reversed. For example firms in the basic materials sector have 
higher COGS and thus a low gross margin, scoring lower on our rankings, and are therefore 
not included as often in the Kelly portfolio. 
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SBX is also dominated by financials, which is reflected in the number of banks included, 
whereas our financials category involves more firms within Real Estate.  
3.5 Carhart 4-factor Model 
The final part of our theoretical framework is integrated in section 4.4, which is a regression 
analysis where we test if there is causality between the four factors included in Carhart’s 
(1997) model, and the returns from our Kelly portfolios. Carhart (1997) illustrates return 
anomalies and the model is often used when running regressions on abnormal returns.  
3.6 Assumptions 
The Kelly strategy in theory only tells investors to invest when there is a potential edge for 
our risk-adjusted Kelly portfolio, which we seek to find through our multiple screening. If 
there is no edge, the wager in the particular equity should be 0 and the investor should instead 
turn to a market-portfolio, i.e., the index.  
 
Furthermore, we assume no transaction costs or taxes. We also infer that stock returns are 
independent, which is not always the case in reality, but is assumed due to time constraints 
and computational constraints. 
 
Finally, we assume no short selling and no leveraging in our portfolios, although our 
calculated Kelly weights for some years are larger than one (we should leverage) and, during 
the crisis, negative (we should short sell the portfolio). When this occurs we therefore turn to 
the alternative proposed to that of the Kelly strategy; if the weight is above 100% we simply 
invest 100% in the best ranking stock (instead of leveraging above this amount) and if our 
weights are negative we proceed with a risk-free investment instead. At this stage investors 
can choose between the risk-free rate and cash; in this paper we use the risk-free rate to keep 
our Kelly portfolio somewhat dynamic. We decide to impose constraints on leveraging and 
short selling since to many factors are unknown; short selling for example requires 
knowledge about parameters such as collateral, covenants, and the cost of borrowing. 
Although this restriction in leverage and short selling opts for misinterpreted returns, some 
researchers encourage avoiding leverage in a Kelly strategy. MacLean, Thorp, and Ziemba 
(2010) state that investors striving for long term growth maximization never gain from 
betting more than the Kelly strategy, arguing that risk increases (lower number of securities 
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in the portfolio) and growth decreases. Finally, we provide an approximation of the Kelly 
portfolio without restrictions in Appendix C. 
  
4. Results  
In line with previous studies on Kelly, our expectation is that the portfolio based on a Kelly 
strategy differs significantly compared to other common portfolio strategies in terms of risk, 
return, and allocation. This translates into the Kelly portfolio being subject to, on the one 
hand, substantially higher volatility and larger drawdowns compared to benchmarks. But, on 
the other hand, produces (within our universe) a relevant growth strategy in the long run. This 
is very much in line with what our research finds. In the next sections we compare our 
portfolio strategies based on descriptive statistics. We also look at the general risk and return 
profile. Additionally, the Kelly portfolio is independently dissected and analyzed through a 
sensitivity analysis where we adjust for several factors to look at the robustness of the 
portfolio strategy. Finally, we proceed with a Carhart (1997) 4-factor regression, and 
compare the factors included to our portfolio strategies.   
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4.1 Return Analysis  
 
 
Figure 7: Cumulative Returns for All Strategies. Figure 7 illustrates the performance of the 
Kelly portfolio and benchmark portfolios. Data is retrieved for the period 2005 to 2015 from 
Bloomberg.  
 
Kelly clearly outperforms the market (SBX) and the benchmark portfolios over a 10-year 
period from 2005-2015. As underlined earlier in this paper we do not use leverage nor do we 
short sell securities, hence a graph where such constraints do not exist should demonstrate a 
smoother exponential character, in line with what previous studies show on the growth of 
wealth (see MacLean, Thorp, Zhao, & Ziemba 2010) but also most likely higher returns. 
When the Kelly portfolio returns pictured above are somewhat flat (for example during 2007-
2009) we have invested in the risk-free asset, hence the linear sections in the graph, whereas 
the strategy encourages the investor to short the portfolio. Furthermore, leveraging would 
also have impacted returns for some periods. Yet, irrespective of the restriction we have 
imposed, the Kelly allocation strategy clearly outperforms all benchmarks. Cumulative 
Return for this period amounts to 953%, whereas the second best strategy (High Beta) 
produces 323%, and the market (SBX) 183%. Finally, we also look at the cumulative return 
for OMXS30 (not included in graph), in order to look at another market index, which during 
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this period amounts to 91%. By looking at the graph above we can see a huge increase in 
return around 2013. In the next sections we look at what drives this huge leap in the Kelly 
portfolio return, and analyze what happens if it is removed.  
 
Strategy Average 
Annualized 
Geometric Return 
 
Average 
Number of 
Holdings 
Maximum 
Drawdown 
Kelly 23.9% 7 -20.0% 
Equally Weight 15.9% 109 -28.2% 
Market Cap 10.7% 109 -20.9% 
Mean-Variance 12.0% 55 -21.9% 
SBX 9.6% 3204 -19.9% 
High Beta 
 
16.8% 109 -26.9% 
Levered SBX 16.1% 320 -57.2% 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (highest absolute value is highlighted in bold). In Table 2, 
descriptive statistics for all portfolio strategies are depicted. Data is retrieved for the period 
2005 to 2015 from Bloomberg.  
 
In line with previous statements on the characteristics of a Kelly portfolio (see for example 
the paper produced by MacLean, Thorp, and Ziemba, 2010) we get higher returns compared 
to benchmark portfolio strategies. The maximum drawdown for Kelly is relatively good 
given the previous statements on its risk nature; only the SBX is more attractive. This is 
largely explained by the fact that we hold the risk-free rate during the financial crisis, which 
our other portfolios do not, consequently punishing their downsides since the financial crisis 
saw returns suffer. Perhaps, though, advocates of the Kelly strategy want to see that the Kelly 
portfolio has the lowest maximum drawdown but in this case SBX is more stable in terms of 
                                                
4 We use data on holdings from 2017 for SBX due to the lack of data availability for 2005 to 2015. 
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downside losses, conceivably due to the more diversified nature of the market. Finally, the 
average number of holdings is much lower for the Kelly portfolio, which illustrates the 
undiversified nature of the Kelly strategy.  
4.2 Return Analysis with Robustness Tests 
 
4.2.1 Impact on the Kelly Portfolio when Removing Outlier  
 
Figure 8: Adjusted Cumulative Returns for the Kelly Portfolio During 2005-2015. In Figure 
8, we show results after Obducat AB is removed. Data is retrieved for the period 2005 to 
2015 from Bloomberg.  
 
To account for the fact that the boost in return during the second quarter of 2013 is largely 
due to one stock’s huge increase, we look at what happens with the cumulative return if we 
exclude this stock. The stock we remove is Obducat AB, which during Q2 2013 returns 163% 
and receives a 78% weight in our portfolio, hence aggressively increases the accumulated 
return for that period. The reason for the increase in Obducat AB’s stock price was mainly 
due to new contracts and orders, as well as lower costs due to a general restructuring of the 
firm structure. We act accordingly since this significant amount of increase of wealth is 
solely due to one stock during one quarter; hence we adjust for the risk that luck drives most 
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of the return. This results in an immense reduction of total return; after the adjustment our 
Kelly strategy returns 354% after 10 years, compared to the portfolio where Obducat AB is 
included, which produces a 953% increase in wealth. Also, the Kelly strategy is now only the 
third best performing strategy. From now on, when we refer to the adjusted Kelly in Figure 8 
(where the outlier, Obducat AB, has been removed) we call it “Kelly Robust”. The Kelly 
Robust is of key interest since we believe the return in Figure 7 is mostly due to luck, as we 
have previously argued.  
 
 
Strategy Average 
Annualized 
Geometric Return 
 
Average 
Number 
of Holdings 
Maximum 
Drawdown 
Kelly Robust 14.7% 7 -20.0% 
Equally Weight 14.9% 109 -28.2% 
Market Cap 10.7% 109 -20.9% 
Mean-Variance 12.0% 55 -21.9% 
SBX 9.6% 3205 -19.9% 
High Beta 
 
16.8% 109 -26.9% 
Levered SBX 16.1% 320 -57.2% 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (highest absolute value is highlighted in bold). Table 3 shows 
the descriptive statistics for all portfolio strategies, where Kelly is now replaced with Kelly 
Robust. Data is retrieved for the period 2005 to 2015 from Bloomberg.  
 
All values are identical to that of Table 2, except the average annualized geometric return, 
which is now lower (14.7% vs 23.9%). The Kelly Robust portfolio is now less convincing 
when we adjust for the outlier.  
                                                
5 We use data on holdings from 2017 for SBX due to the lack of data availability for 2005 to 2015. 
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4.2.2 Impact when Replicating the Kelly Short Selling Restriction on 
Benchmark Portfolios 
 
Figure 9: Adjusted Cumulative Returns for All Strategies During 2005-2015. Figure 9 
depicts how during the period when the Kelly strategy tells us to short sell, i.e., when we hold 
the risk-free investment, the same holding is replicated in all other portfolios as well. Data is 
retrieved for the period 2005 to 2015 from Bloomberg.  
 
Previously we explained that when weights are negative we should short sell according to our 
Kelly strategy, but instead we allocate into the risk-free rate, which gives the Kelly portfolio 
stability during the financial crisis and has a positive impact on our return. One take on the 
short selling constraint in this paper is done by looking at the outcome on return when Kelly 
is in the risk-free rate and at the same time all other strategies also invest in the risk-free rate. 
In this way, we are more “fair” in that the stability Kelly experiences for example during the 
financial crisis is also seen in the benchmark portfolios. The comparison above illustrates the 
effect on return when the benchmark portfolios hold the risk-free investment, i.e. Swedish 
repo-rate, during the same time as Kelly does. This time, Kelly underperforms compared to 
peer portfolios from the period around March 2010 to March 2013, but the cumulative return 
(953%) is still superior to that of all strategies, where the High Beta strategy is the second 
best (920%), and most importantly compared to the market index SBX (407%). We can 
therefore conclude that the strong performance of the unadjusted Kelly portfolio is not due to 
a bias in our short selling restriction. 
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4.2.3 Impact when Replicating Kelly Short Selling Restriction on Benchmark 
Portfolios and Removing Outlier 
 
Figure 10: Adjusted Cumulative Returns for All Strategies During 2005-2015. Figure 10 
builds on Figures 8 & 9 and has the same premise regarding the risk-free rate holding for all 
strategies. Additionally, Figure 10 has also removed Obducat AB to adjust for potential luck 
as we previously argued could be the case. Data is retrieved for the period 2005 to 2015 from 
Bloomberg.  
 
This time, the Robust Kelly portfolio has the second lowest return (354%), only superior to 
that of the market (346%). The best performing strategy is High Beta with 807% return. We 
can from this graph conclude that the Kelly strategy would be less relevant, or even 
irrelevant, for investors if Obducat AB would have been excluded from the portfolio and if 
the benchmark portfolios invested in the risk-free asset during the financial crisis. In the 
previous section we argued that our short selling restriction does not impose a bias; yet, if we 
look at the Kelly Robust strategy in Figure 10 this does not hold.  
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4.2.4 Kelly Robust Portfolio Compared to SBX Leveraged  
 
Figure 11: Leveraging SBX to Match Kelly Robust Volatility. In Figure 11 we leverage 
positions in SBX to match the ex post volatility of the Kelly Robust portfolio. Data is 
retrieved for the period 2005 to 2015 from Bloomberg.  
 
By looking at Figure 11, we can conclude that the previous outperformance, of both Kelly 
and Kelly Robust versus SBX, is to a large extent attributable to higher risk. When we 
leverage SBX to the same level as that of the Kelly Robust portfolio, the cumulative return 
increases to 2615%, which is much higher than the Kelly Robust portfolio’s return of 353%. 
This implies that the risk-return tradeoff, based on the adjusted Kelly portfolio, is not 
attractive. Often when we leverage the SBX, the factor by which we leverage is extremely 
high. This is due to the high underlying volatility of the stocks in our Kelly portfolio. 
Consequently, this implies the volatility of Kelly Robust is often much higher than for SBX, 
which we will show in the next sections. 
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4.3 Risk Analysis 
An important feature of a Kelly strategy as highlighted by previous papers is the large risk 
exposure. In this paper, risk translates into volatility of returns. This section illustrates the 
risk characteristics of our Kelly portfolio; it is exposed to significantly more risk compared to 
other strategies, mainly due to poor diversification, which translates into the number of 
holdings of seven firms on average. The following figures illustrate the larger volatility for 
the adjusted Kelly portfolio.  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Annual Volatility of Returns for all Portfolios. Figure 12 shows the volatility 
characteristics of our Kelly Robust portfolio and the benchmark portfolio choices. Data is 
retrieved for the period 2005 to 2015 from Bloomberg.  
 
From Figure 12 we can see that the volatility of returns moves in the opposite direction to 
that of our benchmarks. As one would expect the volatility of Kelly is relatively lower when 
we hold the risk-free asset, yet higher whenever our portfolio consists of positions in stocks. 
The graph could be of interest for investors with risk preferences (given that they have 
imposed the short selling restriction) who want to hedge risk; there is great stability in the 
adjusted Kelly portfolio in times of general uncertainty (e.g. the financial crisis) since we are 
in the risk-free. Investors could do risk budgeting, i.e., allocation based on individual 
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portfolio risk and return, and thereafter decrease exposure to the benchmark if its volatility 
goes up. Again, we should highlight the fact that the volatility would be different (most likely 
higher) had we not imposed our leverage and short selling restrictions.  
 
 
Figure 13: Comparison of Volatility of Returns. Figure 13 shows the volatility between the 
underlying stocks in the Robust Kelly portfolio, the universal average after the multiple 
screening, and the Market. Data is retrieved for the period 2005 to 2015 from Bloomberg.  
 
The Kelly volatility is the weighted sum of quarterly volatility for all firms in each Kelly 
portfolio for all periods. Hence, this is a measure of the volatility of the underlying stock 
rather than the portfolio as a whole; in this way we also illustrate how the underlying firms in 
the Kelly portfolio are volatile. We use the quarterly volatility since the portfolios are 
rebalanced quarterly. When our Kelly portfolio is based on a risk-free investment, we give 
this portfolio a volatility of 0 due to the stability of Swedish rates. The average volatility is 
the volatility for all the firms in our universe which have been selected based on our ranking 
criterion, and includes all firms irrespective if they are included in our Kelly portfolio or not. 
Finally, we also graph the SBX volatility. Again, we reach the same conclusion as above, but 
this time it is clearer; the volatility of returns for a Kelly strategy is significantly higher 
compared to benchmarks. This is most likely due to the Kelly portfolio holding fewer 
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securities on average, and in line with previous research (see for example MacLean, Thorp, & 
Ziemba (2010)) on the larger risk, relative to benchmarks, a Kelly strategy experiences.  
 
The last part of the risk analysis is conducted through looking at correlations of returns.  
 
Strategy Kelly Robust 
 
Equal Weight Market Cap Mean-Variance SBX High Beta 
Kelly Robust 1.000  
 
    
Equal Weight 0.447 
(0.003) 
1.000 
 
    
Market Cap 0.410 
(0.006) 
0.890 
(0.000) 
1.000    
Mean-Variance 0.400 
(0.008) 
0.907 
(0.000) 
0.990 
(0.000) 
1.000   
SBX 0.404 
(0.007) 
0.904 
(0.000) 
0.983 
(0.000) 
0.984 
(0.000) 
1.000  
High Beta 0.473 
(0.001) 
0.996 
(0.000) 
0.904 
(0.000) 
0.921 
(0.000) 
0.916 
(0.000) 
1.000 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Quarterly Returns for all Strategies During 2005-2015 (p-
value in brackets, where H0 states that correlation is insignificant). Table 4 depicts 
correlations of returns. Data is retrieved for the period 2005 to 2015 from Bloomberg and 
Stata.  
 
To further investigate matters concerning risk and consequently diversification opportunities 
for example, we create the correlations matrix in Table 4. In line with the principles which 
Kelly builds on, this strategy is high risk due to its unique characteristics, displayed in for 
example the low number of holdings, compared to benchmark strategies and indices. 
Correlation with Kelly is below 0.24 for all strategies. Again, as mentioned in previous tables 
in this section, due to Kelly’s low correlation with the other strategies investors could turn to 
a Kelly strategy and include it in their overall portfolio for diversification purposes. 
Correlations are not significant though, most likely because the Kelly portfolio is dynamic 
 
 
35 
 
and because we have many holdings in the risk-free rate, whereas our benchmark portfolios 
are more static.  
 
 
Strategy Robust Kelly 
 
Equal Weight Market Cap Mean-Variance SBX High Beta 
Robust Kelly 1.000  
 
    
Equal Weight 0.557 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
    
Market Cap 0.512 
(0.000) 
0.869 
(0.000) 
1.000    
Mean-Variance 0.486 
(0.001) 
0.893 
(0.000) 
0.984 
(0.000) 
1.000   
SBX 0.505 
(0.000) 
0.889 
(0.000) 
0.979 
(0.000) 
0.980 
(0.000) 
1.000  
High Beta 0.587 
(0.000) 
0.990 
(0.000) 
0.885 
(0.000) 
0,906 
(0.000) 
0.896 
(0.000) 
1.000 
Table 5: Correlations Matrix of Quarterly Returns for all Strategies During 2005-2015 with 
replicated risk-free holdings (p-value in brackets, where H0 states that correlation is 
insignificant). Table 5 illustrates the correlations between all portfolio strategies when they 
replicate the risk-free holding. Data is retrieved for the period 2005 to 2015 from Bloomberg 
and Stata.  
 
Finally, we look at correlations when the benchmark strategies replicate the short selling 
restriction. We do this to get the full picture of correlations with respect to Section 4.2. 
Logically, the correlations between Kelly and the benchmark portfolios are now larger since 
there are more identical holdings. 
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4.4 Carhart 4-factor Regression6  
 
03/2005-12/2015 ReturnKelly Return Kelly Robust ReturnEW 
Intercept 0.002** 
(2.22)  
0.001** 
(1.87) 
0.001*** 
(3.00) 
SMB 0.139 
(1.14) 
0.169 
(1.63) 
0.280*** 
(6.91) 
HML 0.438*** 
(3.46) 
  
0.443*** 
(4.10) 
0.065 
(0.15) 
Market Factor 0.262*** 
(4.63) 
0.276*** 
(5.72) 
0.857*** 
(45.49) 
MOM 0.135 
(1.35) 
0.109 
(1.28) 
0.244*** 
(7.36) 
𝑅" 0.014 0.022 0.521 
Observations 2724 2724 2723 
Note: T-statistics are presented in brackets.  **=p<0.05 ***=p<0.01. 
Table 6: Carhart 4-factor Regression Analysis  
Table 6 depicts a regression analysis on daily returns of the securities in our Kelly portfolios 
and includes Carhart’s (1997) four factors as independent variables. We retrieve information 
from each factor from the database AQR where we get daily data for Swedish stocks. Data on 
the Kelly and benchmark portfolios is retrieved from Bloomberg, and the regression is 
conducted in Stata. 
 
We choose to look at daily returns (instead of 3-month total return) this time to obtain more 
observations. Through the regression, we can see which factor each strategy is exposed to, 
                                                
6 For the benchmark strategies we only look at the Equal Weight portfolio. This is due to the fact that Bloomberg provides us with 
erroneous daily returns for the other strategies, appearing as sudden moves into risk-free and unexplained sporadic returns.  This should not 
impose a severe problem, since the Equal Weight experiences correlation of at least 0.86 with the other strategies containing the same 
stocks.  
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which makes it easy to imitate the returns based on the beta with each factor.  
First, there is a significant, although extremely small, positive alpha on both the adjusted and 
unadjusted Kelly Portfolio, which implies that the Kelly strategy in fact outperforms relative 
to the four risk factors. This in turn supports the usage of the Kelly strategy. Secondly, HML 
and Market Factor are significant and have a positive beta. The significance of HML is 
explained by the fact that we use the P/B-ratio, which is closely related to HML as described 
in previous section. The market factor is most likely significant because of the high 
explanatory power observed in periods when the Kelly strategy is in the stock market. 
Interestingly, though, the correlations we looked at above were not significant for the market 
with our Kelly portfolio. Finally, the other factors are insignificant and based on this we can 
again conclude that the Kelly strategy have somewhat independent returns and can be 
regarded as a diversification strategy. However, our 𝑅" are very low, which implies that 
modeling Kelly returns versus the other four factors has little explanatory power. 
Additionally, it implies that we should be critical towards what we have inferred from the 
regression analysis. Most importantly, there might not exist any alpha, at least not when 
Kelly is modeled towards the four factors. The low 𝑅" in Table 6 is perhaps explained by the 
fact that we look at daily returns for the Kelly portfolio, which varies a lot from the daily 
returns from the other four factors. Although 1.4% and 2.2% are extremely low numbers 
irrespective of what we decide to compare with, previous papers (see for example Roll 
(1973)), also experience low explanatory power, illustrated in a low 𝑅" of 5%, compared to 
benchmarks. This in turn implies the reader should be critical when analyzing the regression 
results, and generally we cannot draw accurate conclusions. We want to stress, though, that 
even though the significant alphas we find are extremely low, the strong performance of both 
the adjusted and unadjusted Kelly portfolios still remains, which is illustrated in our figures. 
Finally, we decide to run a regression on one of the benchmark portfolios. Since the Market 
Cap portfolio experiences very high correlation with the other benchmark portfolios (above 
0.86 at all time) we decide to look at this strategy only, since it is similar to all others. This 
time, the benchmark strategy experiences a significant alpha of 0.01, which is around the 
same as for Kelly. Furthermore, SMB, Market Factor and Momentum have significant 
positive betas. 𝑅" (52%) is also much higher than for Kelly. We can conclude that the 
benchmark portfolio(s) are to a larger extent explained by the four-factor model, and 
investors who are confident with portfolios which experience more explanatory power based 
on Carhart’s (1997) model should replicate the Equally Weighted portfolio investment style. 
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5. Discussion 
 
This paper illustrates how an investor can potentially benefit from trading based on a Kelly 
strategy. Based on historical returns, if one is willing to take on more risk and use a Kelly 
strategy this would have outperformed many traditional portfolio strategies during the 2005 
to 2015 period. From a log growth perspective we have thus shown the strength of a Kelly 
strategy. Our results have strong resemblance to findings by Estrada (2010), who shows that 
Kelly portfolios are less diversified, have a higher (arithmetic and geometric) mean return, 
and higher volatility than benchmark portfolios. Also, when we conduct robustness tests the 
Kelly performs quite well relative our benchmark portfolio strategies. Yet, one test of Kelly 
Robust, where we exclude outliers and replicate the short selling restriction in benchmark 
portfolios, demonstrates weaker performance. Finally, if investors would have leveraged the 
market to volatility levels of the Kelly Robust instead, this would have induced more 
attractive returns. 
 
There is still much left to discuss and comment on. Let us begin by emphasizing four 
approaches in this paper, which affect the final results. First, this paper shows full Kelly, 
whereas previous studies (see for example Davis & Léo (2014)) bring forward the fact that 
few investors use a full Kelly allocation of wealth in practice. Instead, they apply a fractional  
Kelly7 due to the full strategy’s significant risk exposure. This being said, readers who want 
to pursue with this strategy can simply choose to invest a fraction of the weights, which have 
been calculated, but should remember the fact that returns will decrease as a consequence. 
Secondly, we have imposed some constraints, which also affect our results. As mentioned 
throughout this paper, the results would most likely be different if we could leverage and 
short sell our Kelly portfolios since this would affect the return. In other words, this paper 
                                                
7 The Kelly strategy is perceived as risk-abundant and thus investors have turned to look for an alternative, 
namely “Fractional Kelly”, introduced by MacLean, Thorp, & Ziemba (2010). This refinement seeks to 
adjust the initial Kelly (or “full Kelly”) allocation fraction to a smaller amount. To illustrate this, let us 
assume our Kelly calculations on a certain stock results in an optimal allocation of 50% of total portfolio 
weight. Many investors find this number too high and use a fractional Kelly of ¼ resulting in a new 
allocation of 12.5%. In this paper only the full Kelly strategy will be used and not a fraction of weights in 
order to enable us to look at as much risk budgeting of the Kelly strategy as possible.  
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illustrates our take on the Kelly strategy; meanwhile returns can vary greatly depending on 
the different approaches investors take. We provide an approximation of how Kelly returns 
could look without such restrictions in Appendix C. Our third point is that it would be 
interesting to look at the performance of the Kelly strategy whilst using another approach to 
identify the best performing stocks. In this paper we chose three multiples, which turned out 
to be rather successful in predicting returns, yet the usage of other multiples (or approaches) 
to identify predictive power of returns would most certainly generate other results. Previous 
studies, for example Roll (1973), rank stocks based on size of the expected risk premium. He 
concludes that the growth-optimal model (i.e. Kelly) share similarities to the market 
portfolio. In the end, whether the investor can successfully implement the Kelly strategy boils 
down to the ability in making predictions of stock movements; the Kelly strategy can be the 
optimal portfolio strategy only if the investor is successful in doing so. Finally, the Kelly 
(1956) criterion’s main critique brought forward by Markowitz (1976) and Samuelson (1971) 
is the fact that it is most useful when implemented on an infinite time period. This being said, 
the strategy’s main critics might regard the ten-year period we look at as inadequate in order 
to draw any robust conclusion on the usefulness. Yet, our choice of ten years is due to the fact 
that we believe an insufficient amount of stocks were listed before 2005, which would give us 
to little data to work with. Investors should bear these four premises in mind when analyzing 
the results.  
 
Additionally, we have not taken transaction costs or taxes into account. In this paper, one can 
argue that transaction costs should be relatively lower for Kelly since there are fewer 
securities in the Kelly portfolio on average. Yet, in terms of accuracy, returns should be 
adjusted for transaction costs and taxes. We can, however, note that due to the concentrated 
nature of our strategy, we have fewer transactions (which translates into holdings) than the 
portfolio benchmark strategies. 
 
Moreover, an important factor to note is that our strategy is highly dynamic in its positioning 
and risk taking with the most common holding being the risk-free rate; Patel and Lo (2008) 
discuss the difficulty of benchmarking dynamic strategies. They propose a solution to this 
problem, which is not applicable in this paper, i.e., we have not been able to create a suitable 
dynamic benchmark, resulting in us benchmarking our Kelly strategy against static indices, 
which limits the comparability. To adjust for this benchmark dilemma in the best way 
possible, we also included the high beta strategy, as well as looking at effects when 
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leveraging the SBX to the equivalent volatility levels as that of Kelly. Results are mixed, but 
generally not in favour of the Kelly strategy in terms of risk-return tradeoff. Moreover, the 
Kelly strategy beats the market in all our tests, which we have shown, though, is due to the 
larger values of volatility.  
 
When removing the best performing stock the performance is more in line with the 
benchmarks, and even worse in one test. This could be explained by either the reduction of 
alpha or that the skewness of returns decreases. Hakansson (1971) discusses this effect and 
concludes that with low, to non-existing alpha, and normally distributed returns, a Kelly 
strategy is expected to achieve returns close to the mean-variance portfolio (see for example: 
Markowtiz (1976); Roll (1973); Thorp (1971) for more on this). Meanwhile, the strongest 
and most typical effects of the Kelly strategy are illustrated in high alpha and highly skewed 
or fat-tailed distributions, which can be seen in our volatility of returns for example. This 
results in a recommendation to use the strategy in certain options trading systems or stock 
picking strategies with skewed returns.  
 
Finally, the usage of this strategy in practice is highly dependable on the risk attitude of the 
investor. This paper shows that the returns of a Kelly portfolio are sometimes both significant 
and robust. Yet, due to the undiversified and volatile nature of the strategy, it would be 
difficult for institutional actors to implement this strategy, as they would face liquidity and 
volatility constraints. Retail investors should be aware of the dangers with this strategy; the 
risk of largely diminished wealth is significantly higher than alternative strategies and for 
unsophisticated investors the optimal bet size itself can be difficult to approximate. It could, 
however, prove to be a useful strategy for small institutions with a liberal investment 
philosophy, sophisticated (defined as being able to make accurate predictions of the inputs in 
the Kelly formula) retail investors, and day traders. This is because of the high frequency of 
trades each day, which serves as a ground on which day trader’s predictions can be based, 
and which in turn makes predictions more reliable. Finally, we can conclude that some of the 
active Swedish day traders use similar allocation strategies to that of Kelly. Due to the large 
amount of predictions needed, many have created their own take on Kelly, with adaptations 
such as attempting to maintain a constant variance in their strategy. This results in a 
simplified method to optimize the potential edge in an investment.  
 
 
 
41 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper shows the implementation of the Kelly strategy on the Swedish stock market from 
2005 to 2015. We have used a multiple approach to get all our inputs, whereby we proceed 
by comparing the Kelly strategy to benchmark portfolio choices. Although our multiple 
approach is subject to a great level of arbitrariness, by applying the Kelly model outlined in 
this paper an investor in the Swedish stock market between 2005 and 2015 would have 
achieved a superior return compared to investing passively in a market index or such. Our 
results share similarities with, for example, the portfolio simulated by Ziemba (2016) who 
shows that the Kelly strategy’s superiority in producing long run maximum wealth from a 
sequence of favourable investments.  
 
Yet, in order to be as neutral as possible, we do not use the unadjusted Kelly portfolio (Figure 
7) as our foundation of comparison and evaluation; instead we use the Kelly Robust portfolio 
(Figure 8) to account for the potential lucky event with Obducat AB during our time interval. 
We do this in order to strengthen our general conclusions from the Kelly strategy. This in 
turn leads to a different perception of the strategy; the adjusted Kelly strategy is in fact not 
beneficial for investors from a risk-return tradeoff perspective.  
 
Furthermore, contrary to previous findings (see for example MacLean, Thorp, Zhao, and 
Ziemba, 2010), returns do not clearly approach the theorized exponential shape of growth of 
wealth until after the financial crisis. Our model has limits such as no short selling and no 
leveraging which has an impact on this pattern. Surprisingly to us, we are faced with these 
constraints far more often than we had first anticipated. This results in applied allocation, 
which differs, from the “real” (i.e. where there are no constraints) allocations; a model 
without these limitations would during several periods, for example the financial crisis, 
leverage the positions as well as by to short sell stocks with surprising accuracy. Thus, as we 
have emphasized above, a Kelly portfolio without these limitations would be expected to 
perform differently compared our constrained strategy due to compounding.  
 
Finally, if market participants are comfortable in their predictions, alternatively use the 
multiple approach presented in this paper, and are comfortable with an undiversified 
portfolio, investors could potentially benefit from applying the Kelly strategy in relation to 
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traditional portfolio choices. Investors should always bear in mind that the Kelly strategy is 
highly exposed to idiosyncratic risk, whether it is desirable or not.  
 
7. Suggestions for future research 
Generally speaking, the Kelly strategy deserves more attention in our opinion. Previous 
studies (see for example Estrada 2010) and also this paper show that a Kelly strategy would 
have produced strong long-term returns relatively for the period 2005 to 2015 in the Swedsih 
market. This being said, its robustness should be tested on more markets and during longer 
and more time periods, and most importantly with leverage and short selling. Finally, earlier 
on we stated that we assume no correlation between stocks. A practical implementation of the 
Kelly strategy on this market and time era could be re-made with the inclusion of a 
correlation matrix to look at how results would change.   
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9. Appendix 
A. Lognormal Prices (Merton 1969 & Merton 1992)  
To derive a closed-form solution for the optimal fraction under lognormal prices PJ for assets 
j to k, Gaussian log-returns XJ with µj and 𝜎j. The optimization problem is max𝐸[𝐺(𝑓)] = max𝑔 𝑓  ⇔max𝐸 log 1 + 𝑟 + 𝑓 𝑋 − 𝑟  
 
The crucial assumption for deriving the following results is that the logarithm of the price 
ratio follows a Geometric Brownian Motion, also referred to as a Itô-process. In other words 
the price of the risky asset j must satisfy the stochastic differential equation below 
 𝑑𝑃Q,W = 𝜇Q,W𝑃Q,W𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎Q,W𝑃Q,W𝑑𝑍Q,W 
 
Where Zj,t are standard Brownian Motions which might be dependant.  Also, a risk-free asset 
with price R and risk free return 0 ≤ r ≤ µj evolving according to 
 𝑑𝑅W = 𝑟𝑅W𝑑𝑡 
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As with the Black-Scholes-Merton approach, the parameters 𝜎Q, µj and r are supposed to be 
fixed over time to attain one-time constant solutions. The continuous wealth process, 
depending on the consumption factor C in period t, can be described as 
𝑑𝑊W = 𝑓Q,W𝜇Q𝑊WmQX! 	𝑑𝑡 + 𝑓Q,W𝜎Q𝑊W𝑑𝑍Q,WmQX!  
 
In a univariate case, i.e. when there is one risky and one risk-free asset, the wealth dynamic 
can be written as: 𝑑𝑊W = 𝑓	µ + 1 − 𝑓 𝑟 𝑊W − 𝐶W 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑓𝜎𝑊W𝑑𝑍W 
 
Merton (1992) defines the lifetime objective function, which is given by 𝐼 𝑊W, 𝑡 = max𝐸 𝑒2qW𝑈 𝐶W 𝑑𝑡 + 𝐵(𝑊V, 𝑇)V+  
 
With impatience factor ρ and the Bequest valuation function at time T, concave in wealth at 
T. Using a Taylor approximation at t and taking expectations 0 = max 𝑒2qW𝑈 𝐶W + 𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡, 𝑡)𝜕𝑡 + 𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡, 𝑡)𝜕𝑊 [𝑓𝑡((𝜇	 − 	𝑟) 	+ 	𝑟)𝑊𝑡	− 	𝐶𝑡]+12𝜕"𝐼(𝑊𝑡, 𝑡)𝜕𝑊" 𝑓W"𝜎"𝑊W" ≡ 𝜑 
 
with first order conditions 𝜑w = 	 𝑒2qW𝑈? 𝐶∗ − 𝜕𝐼 𝑊W, 𝑡𝜕𝑊 = 0 𝜑𝑤	 = 	 𝜇	 − 	𝑟 𝑊 𝜕𝐼 𝑊W, 𝑡𝜕𝑊 + 𝜕"𝐼 𝑊W, 𝑡𝜕𝑊" 𝑓∗𝑊"𝜎" = 0 
 
The solution to φ, the life time objective function is not trivial we simplify it by assuming 
that  𝐽 𝑊W, 𝑡 = 𝑒2qW𝐼(𝑊W, 𝑡) 
 
Letting T →∞ the Bequest function at T, B(Wt, T), falls out. We can now write the new 
objective function as 
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𝐽 𝑊W = max𝐸 𝑒2qW𝑈 𝐶W 𝑑𝑣^+ , 𝑣 ∈ [0,∞] 
Consequently, the Partial Differential Equation simplifies to the Ordinary Differential 
Equation  0 = max 𝑈 𝐶W − 𝑝𝐽 𝑊 + 𝜕𝐽(𝑊W, 𝑡)𝜕𝑊 [𝑓W((𝜇	 − 	𝑟) 	+ 	𝑟)𝑊W 	−	𝐶W]+12𝜕"𝐽(𝑊W, 𝑡)𝜕𝑊" 𝑓W"𝜎"𝑊W"  
 
Which is no longer a function of time, since 𝑑W falls out 
 
The goal is to produce optimal portfolio strategies under a log-utility function in a normative 
way. In the case of CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) the marginal utility is given by 𝑈 𝐶 = 1𝛾 𝐶} 
The relative risk aversion (RRA) is 𝑅𝑅𝐴 = −𝑈?? 𝐶𝑈? 𝐶 𝐶 = − 𝛾 − 1 𝐶}2"𝐶}2! 𝐶 = 1 − 𝛾 
Notice that we assume that this is a constant, therefore if U(C)=log(C), then γ = 0 and RRA = 
1. Substituting the RRA into our first order condition φc yields 𝑒2qW(∗)\ = 𝐼? 𝑊 ⟺ 𝐶∗ = [𝑒2qW𝐼? 𝑊 ] !}2! 𝑓∗ = − 𝜇	 − 	𝑟𝜎" 𝑊 𝐽′(𝑊)𝐽′′(𝑊) 
As T →∞, we can now write our optimal decision rule as 𝐶∗ = 𝐽′(𝑊) !}2! 𝑓∗ = − 𝜇	 − 	𝑟𝜎" 𝑊 𝐽′(𝑊)𝐽′′(𝑊) 
Merton (1969) shows that the solution of J(W) with \} 𝑊} allows us to solve optimal 
consumption and investment rules in the infinite time case if price changes follows a 
Geometric Brownian Motion and the marginal utility is 𝑈 𝐶 = !} 𝐶} with 𝐶^,W∗ = 𝑝1 − 𝛾 − 𝛾 𝜇	 − 	𝑟 "2𝜎2 1	 −	𝛾" + 𝑟1 − 𝛾  𝑓∗ = 𝜇	 − 	𝑟𝜎" [1	 − 	𝛾] 
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Because we assume that µ, σ and r are constants our optimal fraction 𝑓∗  only depends on the 
risk aversion parameter γ. As we assume logarithmic utility, such that γ = 0 the formula is 
simplified to 𝐶^,W∗ = 𝑝 + 𝑟 𝑊W 𝑓∗ = 𝜇	 − 	𝑟𝜎"  
 
The formula above is equal to the formula we present in section 2.1.2; only this time we 
derive it another way. 
 
 
B. Proebsting’s Paradox (Thorp 2008) 
Due to the fact that we assume each of our bets are independent of one another, our method 
of rebalancing our portfolios is potentially subject to Proebsting’s paradox (named after Todd 
Proebsting who discovered the paradox in a e-mail conversation with Thorp). To illustrate the 
intuition behind the paradox, suppose that you are offered a 2:1 bet with 50% probability. 
After this you are offered a second bet on the same premise but with 5:1 odds; the optimal 
Kelly allocation results in a 47,5% allocation of your bankroll when odds are 2:1, and 40% if 
you were offered the 5:1 bet. Hence, even though we are worse off in the first case, the 
allocation fraction is larger, which illustrates the paradox. 
 
This problem arises due to the concave shape of the Kelly function and is the only potential 
way a Kelly bettor ever risks the entire wealth; normally one should include a correlation 
factor, which we do not, to solve this. Instead, as argued in the text, we solve it by avoiding 
string bets by rebalancing in discrete time intervals (i.e. quarterly). 
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C. Approximation of the Unrestricted Kelly Portfolio 
 
Figure 14: The Kelly Portfolio Without Restrictions. Figure 14 depicts our attempt to show 
Kelly returns for a portfolio, which does not have the leverage and short selling restriction we 
impose. Data is retrieved from Bloomberg for the period 2005 to 2015. 
 
This time, when the Kelly formula indicates we should short sell the portfolio, we short SBX 
instead. We do this by taking the inverse return to that of the SBX due to simplicity. 
Additionally, during periods when we should leverage we simply multiply the factor by 
which we should leverage with the return for the Kelly portfolio that period (the strategy 
leverages six times, maximum 1,5 times the portfolio and minimum 1,04 times). The removal 
of our restrictions has a great positive effect on Kelly returns; cumulative return for the 
period 2005 to 2015 now amounts to 1512% (instead of the initial 953%). This underlines the 
relative strength of a Kelly strategy. We should stress, though, that the calculations in Figure 
14 are very arbitrary since there are several factors, for example the cost of borrowing, which 
we do not consider. Also, we do not apply short selling on the Kelly portfolio; instead we use 
the SBX for simplicity, which most certainly does not reflect the same results. The intuition 
behind figure 14 is to give the reader a general picture of how the Kelly portfolio would 
perform without the restrictions.  
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Kelly
Equal	Weight
Market	Cap
Mean	Variance
SBX	index
High	Beta
Unrestricted	Kelly
